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in California. As to the subsequently commenced action in
California it was held that the trial court abused its disa motion of the Texas plaintiff (a California
to stay proceedings in the California action
which the plaintiff was the Texas defendant) until final
determination of the Texas action. Conceivably both the
'rexas court and the California court could have jurisdiction
to proceed and to determine the identical issues. The motion for a stay of proceedings, therefore, called for an exercise of judicial discretion which would not affect the jurisdiction, as such, of either court. Here, the final determination by either tribunal that it has jurisdiction to award
relief in the case before it will be conclusive that the other
lacks jurisdiction to proceed in the matter before it. The
Simmons case, therefore, is not in point on the issue before
us, and no implications inconsistent with the views we have
announced should be attributed to its holding. We conclude,
in accord with the cases cited (supm, p. 81), that prohibition
is the proper remedy here.
For the reasons above stated, let the writ of prohibition
issue as prayed.

[L. A. No. 23872.

In Bank.

Feb. 3, 1956.]

MARCO J. MADIN et al., Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT COMMISSION, JAMES R. RICHARDSON et al., Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Relation to
Employment.-Though an injury to be compensable must arise
out of employment, the injury need not be of a kind anticipated by the employer nor peculiar to the employment in the
sense that it would not have occurred elsewhere.
[2] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-Causal
connection between the employment and the injury need not
be the sole cause; it is sufficient if it is a contributory cause.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation,§ 61; Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 209 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5, 7] Workmen's Compensation, § 72;
[2] Workmen's Compensation,§ 74; [3] Workmen's Compensation,
§ 93; [4] Workmen's Compensation, § 71; [61 Workmen's Compensation, § 91; [8] Workmen's Compensation, § 224.
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out
Compensable Injuries
doubts as to whether an
are
be resolved in favor of the
!d.-Compensable Injuries- Relation to Employment.-Inin the course of
may arise out
of the employment and hence be compensable although the
which put in motion the force
the injury was
over which the employer had no control and with
which he
no connection.
!d.-Compensable Injuries-Perils Peculiar to Employment.·whcre claimants, who lived in one of employer's rental units
under an agreement to act as caretakers and managers of the
property and collect the rent, were injured when a bulldozer,
which was being used on property in the neighborhood, ran
wild after being started without authority by some boys and
rammed into the unit occupied by claimants, pushing them
while in their beds through the walls of the unit, an award
of compensation may be supported by taking the narrow view
that a portion of the employer's premises injured claimants,
nnd also on the broader view that the employer's premises became unsafe because of the uncontrolled bulldozer.
Id.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-Where
an injury occurs on the employer's premises while the emis in the course of employment, the injury arises out of
the t>mployment unless the connection is so remote from the
employment that it is not an incident of it.
Id.- Compensation Recoverable- Computation of Average
Earnings.-Lab. Code, § 4453, which in effect says that the
earning capacity of any person covered by the workmen's
compensation laws shall not be computed at less than $15 per
week, is not arbitrary or unreasonable.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial
Accident Commission awarding compensation for personal
A wards affirmed.
Higgs, Fletcher & Mack for Petitioners.
Everett A. Cm·ten, Daniel C. Murphy and Edward A.
Sarkisian for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-Petitioners Madin and his insurance carrier
seek the annulment of an award of workmen's compensation
to ,James Richardson and Lethia Richardson, his wife.
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hereinafter
Madin owned certain
14 rental units and the Richardsons were
in
of these rental units. Madin employed the
Richardsons to act as caretakers and managers of the propand collect the rent.
were on duty 24 hours a
and were available to meet any problems that arose
those hours. For this they received 10 per cent of
the rentals and a discount on the rent of the unit occupied
them; Richardson was also to receive $1.50 per hour for
any day labor performed by him.
About 2 o'clock in the morning on July 7, 1952, while the
Richardsons were in bed, a bulldozer, which was being used
in the neighborhood, ran wild after being started
on
without authority by some boys and rammed into the unit
occupied by the Richardsons, pushing them while in their
beds through the walls of the unit and causing the injuries
for which compensation was awarded. The facts in regard
to the action of the bulldozer are fully set forth in Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal.2d 772 [285 P.2d 269], which involved
an action by Richardson and others for the alleged negligence
of Ham Brothers, the owners of the bulldozer, in permitting
the bulldozer to remain on the property where it was being
used without safeguards against its being started. Madin
had no control over the bulldozer or interest in the work
being done by it; nor did he have any connection with the
boys who started it on its destructive course.
Petitioners concede that the injuries occurred in the course
of employment but say they did not arise out of the employment, and contend that section 4453 of the Labor Code, infra,
and its interpretation and application to Mrs. Richardson
are unconstitutionaL
[1] Certain principles recently stated by this court are
applicable to the facts of this case: ''Though an injury to
be compensable must arise out of the employment, that is,
occur by reason of a condition or incident of employment,
the injury need not be of a kind anticipated by the employer
nor peculiar to the employment in the sense that it would not
have occurred elsewhere. (Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Ace. Com., 26 Cal.2d 286 [158 P.2d 9, 159 A.L.R. 313];
Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Inclustrial Ace. Com., 19 Cal.2d 622
[122 P.2d 570, 141 A.L.R. 798] .) [2] If we look for a
causal connection between the employment and the injury,
such connection need not be the sole cause; it is sufficient
if it is a contributory cause. (Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial
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Where a perto be on the streets in the eourse of his emfalls to the street, the

reasonable doubts
are to be resolved in favor of the
Industrial Ace.
27 Ca1.2d
Mut. Cas. Co. . lrulustrial Ace.
P.2d
; Industrial Indcm. Bxch.
Industrial Ace. Corn., 26 Cal.2d ]30 [156 P.2d 9261.)'
Mni. Liab. lnr;. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
41
676, 679 [263 P.2d 4] .)
Consonant with those principles it has been held h1
nnjous situations that injuries occurring in trw course of
also arise out of the employment and hence were
compensable although the factor •d1ich put in motion the
force causing the injury was something over which the
had no control and \Yith which he had no conJJPction. In Khnbol v. Indnstn:az Ace. Com., 173 CaL 351
150, Ann.Cas. 1917E 312, hR.A. 1917B 595], the
was injured when tlw eriling of the room in wl1ich
he was working fell because of an oyerloading- of thr floor
above: the employer had no control owr the upper floor, th0
being done by a third person w·ith whom he had
no eonnection. Pacific Inclem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
RG Cal.App.2d 726 [195 P.2d 919], involved an injury from
w·indow on the employer's premisPs \Vhich fell bea
cause of an explosion on nearby premises with which the
had nothing to do. 'l'he injury occurred in EnterDairy Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 202 Cal. 247 [259
, when an earthquake caused a wall on premises
those of the employer to faJl through the roof of
the employer's premises and broke milk bottles which the
was handling in the course of his employment. In
Industn'al Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
95 Cal.App.2d
804 [214 P.2d 41], the employl'e, a bart0nder, \Tas killed
by shot fired by a cm;tomer's wife at the customer cl11ring
an altercation between them in the bar In Paulsen v. Industrial Ace. Com., 6 Ca1.App.2d 570 I 4fi P.2d
, the employe",
a
lost his eye from the explosion of a dynamitf:
cap in his campfire, the cap apparently having been left
where he built his fire, by a road crew with which his emhad no connection.
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There are cases apparently to the contrary (see Associated
Indem. Corp.
Industrial Ace. Corn., 43 Cal.App.2d 292
[110 P.2d 676], criticized in Industrial Indem. Co. v. Indttstrial Ace.
S1tpm, 95 Cal.App.2d 804; Stm·rn v. Indttstrial Ace.
191 Cal. 4 [214 P. 874] ), but they fail to
give the liberal construction required of workmen's compensation laws and are not in accord with the authorities above
cited. The statement in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Ace.
39 Cal.2d 512 [247 P.2d 697], that there must
be some connection bet>veen the injury and employment, other
than that the employment brought the injured party to the
place of
is not of importance here because the court
was there speaking of course of employment and held that
the employee was at the time engaged in a personal recreational activity of his own off his employer's premises and
"unrelated to the employment."
[6] The commission's award here may be supported by
taking the narrow view that a portion of the employer's
premises injured the Richardsons-the falling walls and glass
from the impact of the bulldozer (see Enterprise Dairy Co.
v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, 202 Cal. 247). It is also
supported on the broader view expressed in the Kimbol case,
supra, where the court said that the injury was ''. . . due
wholly to the unauthorized use by another of the floor above
for storage purposes, and the consequent subjection of that
floor to a greater burden than that for which it was designed.
But because of this unauthorized use of the floor above for
storage purposes those below were in fact in danger of injury
from a collapse of the floor, and in that sense the place in
which Douglas was required to do all his work was an unsafe
place. The danger was one peculiar to that very placean incident of the particular premises used as they were
being used-and it is not unreasonable to say that Douglas
was specially exposed to that danger by reason of his employment. Solely by reason of and in pursuance of such employment he was required to remain in this unsafe place exposed
to this danger of a collapse of the ceiling of the room in which
he was constantly at work. The risk was normally one incident to working in that place, one due solely to its unsafe
condition." (Kim.bol v. Industrial Ace. Com., 173 Cal. 351,
354 [160 P. 150, Ann.Cas. 1917E 312, L.R.A. 1917B 595].)
'I'hns here the employer's premises became unsafe because
of the uncontrolled bulldozer. [7] Where the injury occurs
on the employer's premises, while the employee is in the
course of the employment, the injury arises out of the em-

v.

INDUSTRIAL

Aco.

95

[46 C.2d 90; 292 P.2d 892]

l"'"·rr~<>nr

unless the connection is so remote
that it is not an incident of it. In
b?tdustrial Ace. Com., supra, 95 Cal.App.2d 804, 807,
calling attention to the requirement for liberal construeof workmen's compensation laws, Mr. Justice
: "One
departures was in 'street risk' cases,
Frigidaire Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 103 Cal.
27 [283 P. 974], is an example. . . .
there are the 'horseplay' or 'skylarking' cases. At
in California recovery was not permitted an employee
who was injured through horseplay or skylarking of his fellow employees. . . . But in Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. IndttStrial
Com., 26 Cal.2d 286 [158 P.2d 9, 159 A.L.R. 313], this
was changed and the holding in Coronado Beach Co. v.
P1.ti~sb1.JWU. supra [172 Cal. 682 (158 P. 212, L.R.A. 1916F
and the other cases expressly overruled. . . .
we have cases where the courts have held that because the thing that injured the employee was an instrumentality of the employer, the injury is compensable even
the force which actually was responsible for the
came from outside the employer's premises.
first case on this subject was Kimbol v. Industrial
Com., 173 Cal. 351 [160 P. 150, Ann.Cas. 1917 312,
1917B 595] .•..
"In Pacific lndem, Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 86 Cal.
~~""·-·~ 726 [195 P.2d 919], the employee was injured when
an explosion in a plant across the street caused a window
in the plant where the employee was working to strike the
employee. . . . Again in Enterprise Dairy Co. v. Industrial
Aoo. Oom., 202 Cal. 247 [259 P. 10991, where an employee
was injured by the falling, due to an earthquake, of a twobuilding adjoining his employer's garage, in which
employee was then working, the court held the employer
because the falling of such building through the garage
milk bottles which the employee was handling,
and hence 'he was injured by the broken glass and not by
earthquake.' While this and similar cases labor somewhat
to show that the actual substance which injured the employee
was an instrumentality of the employer, a real analysis of
and rulings in these cases shows that actually the
the
c.ourts were allowing compensation because his employment
orl)U~tnt the employee into what became a position of danger
though that danger was not, and in many instances could
have been foreseen either by the employer or employee,
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to the particular
location.
''As far back

a writer in 18 California Law Re'When an employment places an
place to do his work, indoors or outso placed is injured because at work
in that
should be awarded for the injury,
in the field of disease where it is needed to distinguish
industrial from non-industrial diseases.' The trend of the
decisions in this state since that date has been to support
that
although, as pointed out, the courts have been
reluctant to use that language . . . .
''The latest trend is shown by statements such as the
following: 'The theory upon which the workmen's compensation laws were enacted was that evidence should not be
required to establish all the factors of the workman's environment, but that in order to receive an award he needs show
merely that his work brought him within the range of danger
by requiring his presence in the precincts of his employer's
premises at the time the peril struck. . . . Compensable injuries need not be of the kind anticipated by the employer
or peculiar to the employment. . . . It is sufficient that the
injury results from a danger to which he was exposed as an
employee.' (Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial .Ace. Com.,
supra, 86 Cal.App.2d 726, 728.) This case also cites with
approval the following from Jlarvey v. Caclclo De Soto Cotton
Oil Co., 199 La. 720 [6 So.2d 747, 750] : ' " . . . that his
death was due to the fact that his employment necessitated
that he be at the place where the accident occurred and that,
therefore . . . the accident arose out of, and was incident
to the employment.''' (Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industn:az
.Ace. Com., sttpra, p. 733.) Referring to a Louisiana case
(which is not cited) the court said (p. 732): 'His death
>Yas due to the fact that his work necessitated his presence
there. Therefore, under a liberal interpretation of the compensation act, the accident arose out of and was incidental
to the employee's duties. The court there declared that the
test, in cases where the accident originates from a force
disconnected with the employment, is whether the employee
is exposed to greater danger by reason of his assignments
than that to which the public is subjected, whether the cause
is an act of God or of a mundane inhabitant.' ' "It is
sufficient that the work brings the claimant within the range
of peril by requiring his presence there when it strikes.'' ' "
Petitioners assert that Mrs. Richardson was earning less
said:

r
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75 per
"based upon millimum
"
Section 4453 provided: ''In
average annual
for purposes of temporary disability indemnity only,
tht~ average weekly earnings shall be taken at not less than
($15) nor more than . . . ($53.85). In computing
av<'rage annual earnings for purposes of
disability
the average weekly earnings shall he taken at not
le,.::; than . . . ($15) nor more than . . . ($46.16). Between
thrse Umits the average wrckly earnings, except as provided
in
4456 to 4459, shall be arrived at as follows: ... ''*
By 1hat section the Legislature has in effect said that the
capacity of any person covered
the >vorkmen 's
compensation laws shall not be computed at less than $15
per week vVe find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in
snch a provision. The Legislature could reasonably conclude
that the great bulk of workers would have earnings of at
lem;t that sum. In New Ym·k Cent. R. Co. v. Blanc, 250
U
596, 602 [40 S.Ct. 44, G3 I-1.Ed. 11611, the court was
concerned with the contention that a provision for compensation for disfigurement where there was no showing of
to work was a denial of due process. The court
held that it was reasonable to assume that disfigurement
wm!ld interfere with the ability to find g·ainful employment
and also that: '' . . . impairment of eaming power is [not J
the sole ground upon which eompn1sol'y compensation to
IYOrkmen lt'gitimately may be basec1. . . . In view
and there being no specific finding of :melJ impairment
cases, it is proper to say that in onr opinion the
'due process of law' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
doe;, not require the States to base compulsory compensation
upon loss of rcarning power.
----------------~---~------

was amended in 1955 to change the
on temporary disability and to $23.08
ability. (Stats. 1955, ch. 956.)
46 C.2d-4

L

to $:33.08 nnd $61.54
on permanent dis~
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stated in the Arizona case,
250 U.S. 400
6 A.hR. 1537)]:
of action for
workmen upon grounds not
unjust, the question whether the award
measured as
compensatory damages are measured at common law, or
according to some prescribed seale reasonably adapted to
produce a fair
is for the State itself to determine.'
And we see no constitutional reason why a State may not,
in ascertaining the amount of such compensation in particular
cases, take into consideration any substantial physical impairment attributable to the injury, whether it immediately
affects earning capacity or not." In Rich Hill Coal Co. v.
Chesrmt, 355 Pa. 13 [47 A.2d 801, 806], the court said:
''Section 306 of the Act of 1937 provides that the compensation for injuries resulting in total disability and for all
disability resulting from certain permanent injuries there
specified shonld be not less than $12 per \Ye<'k. Plaintiffs
urge that this minimum might resnlt in the compensation
being greater in some cases than the amount of wages previously earned by the employee. The testimony indicated
that the prescribed minimum exceeded wages only to an
extremely trifling extent and for very limited periods. A
wage of $12 per week is probably less than is earned by all
but a negligible few-no such cases were shown to exist in
the anthracite industry-so that this complaint is essentially
de minimis. Moreover it has been held that such payments do
not violate the clue process clause of the 14th Amendment
to the Federal Constitution. New York Central. R. Co. v.
Bianc, 250 U.S. 596, 602 [40 S.Ut. 44, 63 hEel. 1161], affirming the decision of Judge Cardozo in 8wreling v. Amen·.can
Knife Co., 226 N.Y. 199, 200 [123 N.E.
83]." West v.
Industrial Ace. Corn., 79 Cal.App.2d 711 [180 P.2d 972],
did not involve any question of eonstitutionalit~'·
The awards are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence,
J., and ~reComb, J., concurred.

